Judicial investigation and data protection : the case of cybercrime and e-evidence by Vermeulen, Gert
Prof. Dr. Gert Vermeulen
t.  +32 9 264 69 43
f.  +32 9 264 84 94
Gert.Vermeulen@UGent.be 
Judicial  invest igat ion and data protect ion
The case of  Cybercr ime and e -ev idence
Session 6: New Technologies as Means for and Tools Against Crime
XX Int’l Congress of Penal Law | Rome | 15 November 2019
research publications consultancy conferences
www.ircp.org
Prof. Dr. Gert Vermeulen
+32 9 264 69 43
Gert.Vermeulen@UGent.be   
full-time academic
• international criminal law, EU criminal and JHA policy, cross-border police
and judicial cooperation in criminal matters
• [other]
+25y working with/for (EU& MS) policy makers/police/judiciairies
with data protection background
• BE: Privacy commissioner Belgian DPA
• EU: member SCG SIS II, Eurodac, VIS, CIS, Europol Cooperation Board, BTLE 
(Borders, Travel, Law Enforcement subgroup EDPB)
• CoE: T-PD expert (Consultative Committee Convention 108 + 2nd Protocol)
• ICDPPC: expert group enforcement cooperation
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level new/pending
Protocol (CETS 223) | Modernised Convention 108 ("108+")
draft 2nd Additional Protocol (e-evidence)
General Data Protection regulation (GDPR) 2016/679/EU
draft e-Privacy Regulation (lex specialis)
Law Enforcement Directive (LED) 2016/680/EU
SIS Decision 2007/533/JHA Regulation 2018/1862 (police and judicial cooperation)
CIS Decision 2009/917/JHA
Europol Regulation (EU) 2016/794 
Eurojust Decision 2002/187/JHA Regulation (EU) 2018/1727
EPPO Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 
Swedish Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA
PNR Directive (EU) 2016/681
Prüm Decision 2008/615/JHA | Decision 2008/616/JBZ
Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA
Decision 2009/316/JHA
ECRIS-TCN Rgulation (EU) 2019/816
interoperability Regulation (EU) 2019/818 (police, judicial, asylum, migration)
Convention 29 May 2000 (Article 23)
Directive 2014/41/EU on the EIO (Article 20)
draft Regulation (production & preservation orders)
draft Directive (legal representatives)
CoE
e-Privacy Directive 2002/58/EC
Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EG (annulled)
Framework Decision 2008/977/JBZ 
R(87)15 use of personal data in the police sector
Convention 28 Januari 1981 (ETS 108)
Additional Protocol 2001 (ETS 181)
Cybercrime Convention 2001 (Budapest) (ETS 185)
Directive 95/46/EC
ECRIS
EU
2nd Additional Protocol 2001 to the MLA Convention (ETS 182) (Art. 26)
existing/old
e-evidence
Directive (EU) 2019/884
MLA
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EU
• “easy” to establish a compelling asymmetrical mechanism, including sanctions
• advantage of data protection coherence in the EU (market) bubble
• CONS reached a general approach on both the draft Regulation and Directive
• CONS also agreed to a double negotiation mandate for COM, with US (Cloud Act) 
and the CoE (2nd additional protocol) in June 2019
• whilst co-decision PE far from final | very critical LIBE report, release end last week
• covered also in session 8, be it not primarily from a data protection perspective 
CoE | T-CY work on 2nd additional protocol Budapest Convention (world)
• purpose: to render traditional MLA under the Convention more effective
• on direct disclosure by service providers of subscriber information
• on giving effect to orders from another Party for expedited production of data
• multiple scenarios | within 108+ | 108+ to non-108+ | non-108+ to 108+/non-108+
• particular EU concerns (which do matter in a CoE context)
• T-PD(2019)8 | draft opinion on T-CY draft T-CY | next week T-PD Plenary: adoption
Introduction & context
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explanatory report (on pages 16-17, in point 4.2, para 4) 
• “Information needed [in specific cases] for the purpose of identifying a subscriber of a 
service may include certain Internet Protocol (IP) address information – for example, the 
IP address used at the time when an account was created, the most recent log-on IP 
address or the log-on IP addresses used at a specific time”
T-PD
• recognises that access to both static or dynamic IP addresses may be required in specific 
cases for the sole purpose of establishing the information as meant in Article 18.3 
Budapest Convention
• stresses, however, that subscriber data should never be inclusive of any (other) traffic 
data or content data
• therefore recommends to specify under which circumstances IP addresses could be 
considered as subscriber information, as meant in Article 18.3 Budapest Convention
• can only support the potential inclusion of IP addresses under subscriber information if it 
is specified in the actual Protocol text (both in the articles on direct disclosure and 
traditional orders for expedited disclosure) and in the explanatory report that IP 
addresses are to be used solely for identification purposes and in specific cases only
Direct disclosure subscriber info 
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T-PD equally recognises that some Parties currently treat dynamic IP address information as 
traffic data (for constitutional or other principled reasons) or as ‘access data’ (as a newly 
proposed category of data in the future EU Regulation on European production and preservation 
orders for electronic evidence in criminal matters)
• based thereon, T-CY has suggested, through the insertion of para 9.b of the draft text, to allow 
such Parties to reserve the right not to apply the provision on disclosure of subscriber 
information to “certain types of access numbers” (also reflected in the proposed explanatory 
report: “Accordingly, paragraph 9.b provides a reservation for some Parties”)
• T-PD regrets that the proposed solution leads to a fragmented regime for criminal cooperation 
and the protection of personal data, thus impacting the Protocol effectiveness 
Re the full opt-out possibility (in point 9.a of the draft text) of the direct disclosure regime
• T-PD notes that, due to the fragmentation that is likely to arise from the variability of regimes, 
the “[high] expectations set for the new Protocol”, in that it “will need to stand the test of time 
in order to make a difference in terms of an effective criminal justice response with human 
rights and rule of law safeguards” may not be met
• If introduced at all, any new direct disclosure regime should be sufficiently straightforward and 
binding for all ratifying Parties, sustainably building on a common commitment to shared data 
protection conditions, safeguards or principles (infra)
Direct disclosure subscriber info [continued] 
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explanatory report to paragraph 4 of the proposed text orders for expedited data 
production
• “under some Parties’ domestic laws, the production of traffic data may require 
further information because there are additional requirements in their laws for 
obtaining such data”
• T-PD questions the T-CY position that the only consequence thereof is that 
“additional information may need to be provided to the requested Party […] in 
order to give effect to such order”
• T-PD finds the possibility of an opt-out from the regime as far as traffic data is 
concerned, as foreseen in paragraph 12 of the proposed text, equally insufficient
T-PD believes that
• the principled and historical distinction the Budapest Convention has made 
between measures relating to subscriber data vs. measures relating to traffic data, 
based on a difference in intrusiveness, should not be sacrificed for alleged reasons 
of efficiency
Expedited production of traff ic data
15 November 2019 | Judicial investigation and data protection | Session 6 | XX International Congress of Penal Law
7
research publications consultancy conferences
www.ircp.org
Prof. Dr. Gert Vermeulen
+32 9 264 69 43
Gert.Vermeulen@UGent.be   
T-PD takes the position that
• a Protocol regime for disclosure of traffic data should, as a minimum requirement, allow 
for the combined data protection obligations of at least the Party of the requesting 
competent authority and the Party where the data subject was present whilst using the 
targeted service(s), if different from the requesting Party or the Party where the service 
provider is present
• as soon as it is possible to establish, based on the prior obtaining of subscriber data, 
where a person was while using any targeted service(s), it is key for the Protocol to make 
sure that the data protection, procedural and rule of law safeguards of the latter Party 
may be applied and complied with
• in the case where that Party is the Party where the order originates from, such 
assurance is implied already, so that the Protocol may – only – then suffice allowing for 
the combined data protection obligations of at least the Party of the requesting 
competent authority and the Party where the service provider [or executing 
competent authority] is located 
• the Protocol should contain specific provisions to guide Parties in case of conflict of laws, 
in that the laws offering the widest protection to the data subject will apply
Expedited production of traff ic data [continued]
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Both the suggested direct disclosure and traditional cooperation mechanism pertain 
to the obtaining of data from service providers in another Party’s territory. The related 
draft explanatory report to both mechanisms reads as follows: 
“[T]he term ‘a service provider in the territory of another Party’ requires that the 
service provider be physically present in the other Party. Under this Article, the 
mere fact that, for example, a service provider has established a contractual 
relationship with a company in a Party, but the service provider itself is not 
physically present in that Party, would not constitute the service provider being ‘in 
the territory’ of that Party. Paragraph 1 requires, in addition, that the data be in 
the service provider’s possession or control.”
Criteria for provider ‘presence ’
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T-PD insists that further clarification be added, ideally in the text of the draft articles 
themselves, if not at least in the corresponding parts of the explanatory report, on when a 
service provider will be considered ‘physically present’ in a Party’s territory
• against the back-drop of the significant jurisprudential contentieux in the past decade 
around jurisdiction over service providers abroad, in which a multitude of criteria (a 
range of ‘establishment’ criteria, ‘offering’ criteria etc.) has passed in review, the 
proposed two criteria (negatively: that a contractual relationship does not suffice; 
positively: that data must be in the service provider’s possession or control) seem 
insufficient to bring optimal clarity
• T-PD finds such clarity crucial in order for any future mechanism not to be undermined 
as well as to avoid forum shopping by authorities/Parties
• unless mandatory common safeguards were to be incorporated in the Protocol
• risk for undermining: multinational service providers may [still] be confronted with parallel 
orders issued to its establishments or branches in several jurisdictions
• risk for forum shopping: authorities/Parties may opt to send orders to the jurisdiction of 
presence of the service provider where the lowest data protection standards apply
• T-PD sees relevance in adding more clarity, e.g. by stipulating in the Protocol or in the 
explanatory report that a service provider will be considered ‘physically present’ in a 
Party’s territory
• when it has a stable infrastructure through which it actually pursues an economic activity 
for an indefinite period and from where the business of providing services is carried out or 
managed
Criteria for provider ‘presence ’ [continued]
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The explanatory report to the envisaged article on disclosure of subscriber information 
clarifies that the “special procedural instructions” that need to accompany a disclosure 
order submitted to service providers are meant to “cover, in particular, any request for 
confidentiality, including a request for non-disclosure of the order to the subscriber or 
other third parties” and that “[t]herefore, in order to avoid the risk of premature disclosure 
of the investigation, Parties are encouraged to be aware of applicable law and a service 
provider’s policies concerning subscriber notification, prior to submitting the order under 
paragraph 1 to the service provider”
• T-PD requests reconsideration of the opening left for domestic laws or discretionary 
policies of service providers that would not guarantee the confidentiality sought
• reason: whilst confidentiality may be important to maintain efficiency in criminal 
investigations, it may equally be vital in safeguarding data protection
• T-PD favours the inclusion of a self-standing provision on confidentiality in the Protocol, 
for which it suggests inspiration is drawn from:
• Articles 26.2 of the Budapest Convention (ETS 185)
• Articles 27.8 of the Budapest Convention (ETS 185)
• Article 25 of the Second Additional Protocol to the Convention on MLA in criminal 
matters (ETS 182)
Confidentiali ty
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The explanatory report to the envisaged article on traditional orders for the expedited 
production of data clarifies that “[u]nder paragraph 3.c, the request should also include all 
special instructions, including for example requests for certification or confidentiality under 
Article 27.8 of the Convention, at the time of transmission to ensure the proper processing 
of the request”
• T-PD stresses that, from the draft T-CY text as it stands, it cannot be derived that Article 
27.8 of the Budapest Convention applies in a Protocol context
• T-PD, consequently, stresses the importance that a self-standing provision on 
confidentiality be included in the Protocol itself, for both the direct and the traditional 
mechanism for obtaining information from service providers
Confidentiali ty [continued]
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importance of two-directional data protection conditions and safeguards
• since receiving entity may be either a competent authority (in case of traditional MLA or of 
direct, asymmetrical transfers) or a private data controller (service provider)
only three references in the explanatory report, exclusively targeted at “parties that have 
data protection requirements” (1-2) or would wish to limit or refuse cooperation based on 
“conditions and safeguards (including with regard to data protection)” (3)
• 1. only a reminder to parties having data protection requirements of their obligation under 
domestic laws to provide “a clear basis for the processing of personal data” by service 
providers in response to an order which they directly received
• 2. relates to int’l data transfers, without stipulating the actual safeguards that a service 
provider may require to be able to transfer “responsive subscriber information” (blank cross-
reference to a future article on data protection, relying on “important public interest” (infra)). 
• 3. “MLA is in principle to be extensive, and impediments thereto strictly limited”, so that 
“accordingly, conditions and refusals should also be limited in line with the objectives of this 
Article to eliminate barriers to transborder sharing of subscriber information and traffic data 
and to provide more efficient and expedited procedures than traditional mutual assistance”
• T-PD considers that labelling data protection conditions and safeguards as potential 
‘impediments’ and ‘barriers’ is inappropriate and does not reflect the balanced functioning 
of democracies safeguarding human rights and the rule of law. It is furthermore not in line 
with the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. It believes – based on tangible 
experiences – that the efficiency of cooperation would be genuinely enhanced when 
embedded in a shared commitment to respect common data protection principles. 
Data protection conditions/safeguards
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In claiming that the envisaged direct disclosure regime in the Protocol reflects an 
“important public interest” (supra), the T-CY proposal seeks to base the entire direct 
disclosure concept exclusively on the derogatory regimes of Article 14.4.c of Convention 
108+ and, for the EU Member States, on Articles 49.1(d) juncto 49.4 GDPR
• T-PD firmly disagrees with and opposes the envisaged structural and systemic reliance on 
derogations as a standardised means to allow for direct, asymmetrical transfer
preferred, straightforward and sustainable option: Protocol Parties accede to 108+
subsidiary options:
• incorporation in the Protocol (as a legally binding instrument between the Parties) of common 
mandatory data protection safeguards [list: infra point 7], grounded in, closely aligned with 
and consistently interpreted in line with Convention 108+
• building ETS 182, so as to ensure consistency with at least the CoE’s data protection acquis in 
the context of judicial cooperation in criminal matters
• leaving it to the competent authority or data controller of a Party to make the transfer of 
personal data conditional upon an appropriate level of data protection
• comparable with the optional regime as in Article 26.3, 2nd indent ETS 182, which would 
need t be rephrased as to ensure two-directional applicability, both in the context of direct 
transfers and transfers between traditional competent authorities
Data protection conditions/safeguards [continued]
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in the last subsidiary option (building on ETS 182), T-PD suggests, in view of enabling, ensuring, 
enforcing compliance by private data controllers with the Protocol’s data protection 
conditions/safeguards (public international law), to
• stipulate in the Protocol that if a data controller or competent authority of a Party requires an 
appropriate level of data protection in the receiving Party, such condition shall be considered 
to be met if “the receiving competent authority or data controller of the latter Party 
undertakes to process the personal data transferred subject to the conditions and safeguards 
under the domestic law of the former Party [i.e. the Party from where personal data would be 
transferred], including obligations the latter has undertaken under  [Convention 108 and its 
Protocol] and/or other applicable bilateral or international data protection agreements 
guaranteeing the protection of individuals by the implementation of at least the following 
safeguards, grounded in, closely aligned with and consistently interpreted in line with 
Convention 108+ [list infra point 7]” [para 25]
• combined data protection of at least the Parties of the requesting competent authority and 
the location of the service provider [or executing competent authority] [para 26]
• ex Article 14.3.b of Convention 108+ (“legally-binding and enforceable”), T-PD suggests an 
additional obligation for Parties to stipulate in their domestic legislation that violations of such 
undertaking by a receiving competent authority or data controller in their territory may give 
rise to all judicial and non-judicial sanctions and remedies available under their laws [para 27]
Data protection provider compliance [para 25-27]
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whilst the draft articles on direct disclosure or traditional, expedited ordering of 
information limit the issuing of orders to information which is needed for the issuing 
Party’s specific criminal investigations or proceedings, the draft text remains fully 
silent on the purposes for which transferred personal data can be used by the 
receiving competent authority or service provider
• T-PD recommends to include explanations at least in the explanatory report on a 
commonly agreed distinction between data processing (including transfers) for 
criminal investigation purposes and those undertaken for national security 
purposes, in line with the Issue paper “Democratic and effective oversight of 
national security services“ published by the CoE Commissioner for Human Rights
• T-PD requests that clear use restrictions be inserted in the Protocol, applicable to 
both direct and traditional, expedited cooperation
• T-PD suggests to phrase such use restrictions based on Article 26 of ETS 182, 
amending them mutatis mutandis and extending them to also cover use limitations 
upon a private data controller (service provider) to which a request is transferred
• this could translate in three provisions, stipulating respectively that
Use restrictions
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1. [mutatis mutandis adaptation of Article 26.1 ETS 182] personal data transferred by 
a competent authority or data controller of a Party as a result of the execution of a 
request made under the Protocol by a competent authority of the receiving Party, 
may be used by the latter only for: 
a. the purpose of investigations or proceedings concerning criminal offences related 
to computer systems and data, or for the collection of evidence in electronic form 
of a criminal offence within the scope of articles 14.2 and 25.1 of the Budapest 
Convention;
b. other judicial/administrative proceedings directly related to proceedings under (a);
c. preventing an immediate and serious threat to public security; 
2. [mutatis mutandis adaptation of Article 26.2 ETS 182] such data may however be 
used by the competent authority for any other purpose if prior consent to that 
effect is given by either the Party from which the data had been transferred, or the 
data subject
3. [extension to cover use limitations for service providers] the request received and 
the information it contains can only be used by the receiving data controller for the 
purpose of the execution of a request made under this Protocol
Use restrictions [continued]
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In both subsidiary options (preferred option: Parties required to accede to Convention 108+), T-PD 
requests incorporation in the Protocol of at least the following safeguards, grounded in, closely 
aligned with and consistently interpreted in line with Convention 108+ 
a. purpose legitimacy, purpose specificity and purpose limitation;
b. lawfulness;
c. fairness and transparency;
d. necessity for and proportionality to the legitimate purpose pursued; 
e. non-excessive data processing and data minimisation;
f. adequacy, relevance and accuracy of data;
g. data retention limitation;  
h. accountability of controllers and processors;
i. logging, data security and data breach notification duty; 
j. specific, additional safeguards for special categories of sensitive data;
k. lawful use of exceptions and derogations;
l. enforceable data subjects’ rights and effective administrative or judicial redress;
m. appropriate protection in (onward) data transfers;
n. free, specific and explicit consent where consent of the data subject is the legal basis [FN: specialty]
o. effective independent oversight
Substantive data protection safeguards
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T-PD
• stresses the importance of the effectivity of the data protection safeguards and 
ensuring that Parties to the Second additional Protocol effectively apply and 
enforce them in practice
• proposes that an evaluation of the implementation of the data protection 
safeguards be carried out, possibly relying on the findings and recommendations of 
the mechanism introduced in Article 4.3 of Convention 108+ for Parties to 
Convention 108+, and, for other countries, on Article 23.f of Convention 108+
Monitoring effectivity of safeguards
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